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RECENT DECISIONS
the same offenses and the effects of enforcement are the same, why
should the defendant in the state prosecution be afforded the presump-
tion of innocence, requiring him to be proved guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, while the defendant in the municipal prosecution is not
presumed innocent?
In view of the strong argument for affording the presumption of
innocence to defendants in ordinance violation cases, which has been
recognized by many other states, partial departure from the mere pre-
ponderance rule by our court in the Geier case could be an indication
of a more complete departure in the future should the court be con-
fronted with the proper case.
TERRY R. GRAY
Products Liability: Strict Liability in Tort-Defenses-Indem-
nity-Contribution: In 1957, plaintiffs Suvada and Konecnik, part-
ners, purchased a used reconditioned tractor unit from defendant White
Motor Company, for use in their milk distributing business. The brake
system for the tractor was manufactured by defendant Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Company and installed by White.
Three years later, the brake system failed and the truck collided with
a Chicago Transit Authority bus, causing injuries to a number of the
bus passengers and considerable damage to the bus and plaintiff's
tractor-trailer milk truck. In Suvada v. White Motor Co.,' the plaintiffs
sued to recover the costs they incurred in (1) repairing their tractor-
trailer unit, (2) repairing the bus, and (3) settling the personal injury
claims of the bus passengers, including the costs of legal services and
investigation.
The complaint alleged that both Bendix and White were liable for
the stated damages because of a breach of implied warranty and negli-
gence. The trial court, in response to the defendants' motion, ruled
plaintiffs had stated causes of action for damages to their tractor-trailer
unit against White on the warranty and negligence theories, and against
Bendix on the basis of negligence but dismissed the counts for damage
to the bus, personal injury claims, and expenses. Plaintiffs appealed
from this order to an intermediate appellate court, which ruled that
plaintiffs had stated causes of action for all elements of damage pleaded
against White and Bendix, on the basis of breach of an implied
warranty.'
Only Bendix sought review of this holding, giving rise to the de-
cision herein discussed. Bendix argued that any warranty as to its
products ran only to White, since the plaintiffs were not in privity with
Bendix. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ruled that Bendix's
1- Ill. 2d. -, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965).2 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E. 2d 313 (1964).
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liability rested in strict liability in tort, rather than in implied warranty;
and, therefore, that lack of privity was no defense. This rule was based
upon Lindroth v. Walgreen Co.,3 which held that a manufacturer may
be liable in tort (negligence) for injuries to a person not in privity with
him. Other Illinois cases before Suvada had abrogated the privity
defense in negligence actions against a supplier,4 an assembler of parts,5
and a manufacturer of component parts.6
By adopting the theory of strict tort liability in a products liability
case, the court created a new cause of action in Illinois, and cast its
lot with the increasing number of states which recognize that theory.
As of 1964, one writer 7 listed nearly twenty jurisdictions which had
gone beyond food products and products intended for intimate bodily
use in holding the manufacturer strictly liable for the user's injury and
damage. This trend in state and federal courts has been bolstered by
such authority as the Restatement of Torts, Second,8 and by writings
of prominent commentators in this field.9
In imposing strict tort liability upon the defendants, the Illinois
court depended mainly on the strict liability theory generally used in
implied warranty cases in the sale of food. In Wiedeman v. Keller,10
the court held that the manufacturer and seller of food are strictly
liable for the unwholesome condition of the food they sell, and that
this strict liability is imposed as a matter of public policy by operation
of law. Later cases provided that privity of contract is not essential
to recovery in a food case, even though the action is, in form, a warranty
3407 Ill. 121, 94 N.E. 2d 847 (1950).
4NWratts v. Bacon and Van Buskirk, 18 Ill. 2d 226, 163 N.E. 2d 425 (1960).
5 Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934). Rotche closely
followed MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).6 Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 4; Gray v. American Radiator and
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961).
7 Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446, at 449 (1964). See
also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897(1963); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P. 2d 168
(1964); HURSCH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY, §6.62 (1965);
FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY, §§16, 16A (1965).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, §402A (1965):
"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
9 James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 44 (1955); Keeton, Products
Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 ILL. L. FORUit 693(1964) ; Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
10 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
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action.11 On this basis, the court posed what it considered to be the
crucial question in this case: whether there is any reason for restricting
the strict liability concept to food cases only, leaving cases involving
products other than food to be decided on warranty or negligence
principles. The court found no justifying reason for the distinction,
holding that policy considerations and arguments which support the
imposition of strict liability in food cases apply to other products as well:
Without extended discussion, it seems obvious that public interest
in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to pur-
chase the product, and the justice of imposing the loss on the
one creating the risk and reaping the profit are present and as
compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and other products,
where the defective condition makes them unreasonably danger-
ous to the user, as they are in food cases.12
Following Dean Prosser's suggestion that, "If there is to be strict
liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared outright,
without an illusory contract mask,"' 3 the court gave its approval to
the similar reasoning in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., where
the California Supreme Court stated:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on
the theory of an expressed or implied warranty running from
the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the re-
.quirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the
liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and
the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its
own responsibility for defective products makes clear that the
liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties
but by the law of strict liability in tort.
14
Thereby the court freed itself from the superfluous requirements
and language of warranty actions, and obviated the necessity of passing
upon the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 namely, its
definitions of buyer and seller, provisions as to scope of warranty and
privity, and requirements of notice of breach.
Bendix further contended that the imposition of strict liability in
tort would require it to guarantee the use made of its brake system by
11 Tiffin v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E. 2d 406(1959); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d
162 (1947); Decker and Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828(1942), cited with approval in Suvada v. White Motor Co., - Ill. 2d -,
210 N.E. 2d 182, 185 (1965).
12- Ill. 2d at - , 210 N.E. 2d at 186. See also Keeton, supra note 9, at 695;
Goldberg v. KolIsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 440, 191 N.E. 2d 81,
85 (1963).13 Prosser, supra note 9, at 1134. See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) ; Goldberg, supra note 12.
14 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P. 2d 897,
901 (1963).
's S.H.A. Ch. 26 (1962).
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all those in the manufacturing and distributive process, and by the
product's consumers as well. The court replied:
The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted
from a condition of the product, that the condition was an un-
reasonably dangerous one, and that the condition existed at the
time it left the manufacturer's control.1
6
This conclusion conforms with the generally accepted limitation of
strict liability in tort, i.e., that the liability of the producer or seller
is not that of an insurer, so as to be absolute in the literal sense of the
word. The liability is "strict" because there is no need to prove that
the manufacturer or other defendant was negligent. If the article left
the defendant's control in an unreasonbaly dangerous or unsafe con-
dition, the defendant is liable whether or not he was at fault in
creating that condition, or in failing to discover and eliminate it.'
Finally, Bendix challenged the plaintiff's right to indemnification, on
the basis that, in settling the claims of the Chicago Transit Authority
and the injured bus passengers, the plaintiffs were either volunteers or
joint tort feasors, and in either case not entitled to indemnity. This
argument produced a somewhat cryptic reply:
Plaintiff's liability for damage to the bus and injuries to the
passengers must, of course, be based on their negligence, as
Bendix suggests. It does not follow, however, that plaintiff's
negligence will, as a matter of law,... prevent them from seek-
ing indemnity from Bendix.18
The Suvada case affords an excellent illustration of some of the
problems which tend to arise as subordinate incidents of the newly-
emerging doctrine of strict liability. Although the opinion disposes of
problems of indemnification, contribution, assumption of risk, and con-
tributory negligence in rather abrupt fashion, it is evident that the
court's espousal of the doctrine of strict liability has compelled a sub-
stantial recasting of conventional rules in these areas.
Indemnification, contribution, assumption of risk, and contributory
negligence have in common the fact that all are doctrines by which the
ultimate burden of a given loss or injury may (or may not) be shifted
between two parties having a measure of common responsibility for the
occurrence.' 9 Indemnification shifts the entire burden ;20 contribution
shifts a portion of the burden;" assumption of risk and contributory
negligence prohibit or limit the right of an injured person to shift his
loss to one who, but for the assumption of risk or contributory negli-
16- Ill. 2d at - , 210 N.E. 2d at 188. See also Tiffin v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E. 2d 406 (1959).
17Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L. J .5, 13 (1964).
18- Ill. 2d at- , 210 N.E. 2d at 188.
19 See text accompanying notes 26 to 63, infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 45 to 57, infra.
21 See text accompanying notes 58 to 63, infra.
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gence, would be responsible for the injury. All four doctrines have
developed, however, as overlays of conventional principles of negligence
liability. All four, therefore, are conventionally grounded upon fault-
based liability, and adopt, in conventional statement, much of the
language of the fault principle2
Strict liability, by contrast, asserts responsibility for conduct which
is neither intentionally nor negligently harmful, and which is wrongful
only in the sense that, de facto, a legally protected interest has been
invaded. Strict liability in tort rests on principles of public policy which,
unlike intentional conduct and negligence, are not individualistic, but
socially and economically mechanistic.2 3 Its objective is to shift the
burden of personal injury to those who are deemed best able to bear
the loss.
24
It is the purpose of this analysis to examine each of these doctrines
in their conventional uses, and to determine, in the light of the Suvada
decision, each doctrine's applicability in an action brought upon a
theory of strict liability. In each instance, the standard use, as well as
the Illinois and Wisconsin applications will be examined, in order to
determine whether or not these subsidiary doctrines must be recast in
terms of the same policy considerations upon which strict liability in
tort is based.2
5
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND AssuMPTION OF RiSm
Contributory negligence is generally defined as negligent conduct
on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection, barring his right to recovery.26 The
use and effect of the contributory negligence doctrine varies widely
from one jurisdiction to another, and the completeness of the bar de-
pends upon local case law or statutes which have modified the doctrine.
In Illinois, it is beyond dispute that any contributory negligence in
an action based upon negligence is a complete defense, which relieves
the defendant of all liability for the plaintiff's injuries.2 7 Wisconsin
law, in comparison, has modified the contributory negligence doctrine
by statute and judicial decision. Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence
Statute28 provides:
s2 Keeton, supra note 9, at 698.
23Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963).
24 Ibid.; See also Keeton, supra note 9, at 694.
25 Keeton, supra note 9, at 701; Noel, supra note 7, at 449; Wade, supra note
17, at 12.
26 PRossER, LAW OF ToRTS, §64 (3rd ed. 1964); 36 Am. Ju,. Negligence §174(1942).
27Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Oswald, 338 Ili. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930);
Pantlen v. Gottschalk, 21 111. App. 2d 163, 157 N.E. 2d 548 (1959); Ferrell
v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. App. 2d 321, 179 N.E. 2d 410 (1961).
28 WIs. STAT. §331.045 (1963).
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Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Accordingly, contributory negligence is not a complete bar in Wis-
consin, but, through the doctrine of comparative negligence, the con-
tributorily negligent plaintiff may recover an amount reduced in propor-
tion to his negligence, so long as his negligence is not more than 50
per cent causual. 29 Illinois, on the other hand, has expressly repudiated
the comparative negligence doctrine. 30
Assumption of risk is defined as a voluntary exposure to a known
and appreciated danger, which danger or risk of harm was created by
another's conduct.31 The doctrine has been greatly criticized, and has
been abolished, or severly limited, in several states, including Wiscon-
sin.32 In those states which recognize the doctrine, including Illinois,
the plaintiff is barred from recovery where he voluntarily acted in the
presence of a known and appreciated danger, even though his actions
were not negligent, and were performed with the greatest care possible.33
In determining the availability of either contributory negligence or
assumption of risk as defenses to a products liability action, the nature
of the action, whether in warranty, misrepresentation, or negligence,
will be of strong significance.
In an action to recover for damages or injury resulting from a
breach of an implied or express warranty, a serious legal problem is
encountered when a court is asked to consider contributory negligence
as a defense to the claim. A proper respect for nomenclature alone seems
to indicate that contributory negligence is available as a defense only
in cases resting on negligence. Most courts have agreed, holding that
contributory negligence will not defeat a warranty action,3" because
either (1) breach of warranty is solely an action ex contractu, or (2)
8
29 Grana v. Summerford, 12 Wis. 2d 517, 107 N.W. 2d 463 (1961); Millsap
v. Central Wisconsin Motor Transport Co., 28 Ill. 2d 122 (1963).
30 Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 134 N.E. 2d 526 (1956).
31RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §496D (1965). 65 C.J.S. Negligence §174
(1950).
32 McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.
2d 14 (1961).
3 Ferguson v. Lounsberry, 58 Ill. App. 2d 456, 207 N.E. 2d 309 (1965); Kelly
v. Fletcher-Merna Co-op Grain Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 173 N.E. 2d 855
(1961); Stahl v. Dow, 332 Ill. App. 233, 74 N.E. 2d 907 (1947).
34 Kassouf v. Lee Bros. Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276, (1963);
Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963);
Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Electric Co., 280 Il1. 386,
117 N.E. 460 (1917); FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at§16.01(3). But cf. Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2244.
(N.J. October 25, 1965).
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warranty imposes strict liability. Either reason is sufficient to render
the defense inapplicable.3
While no case has unambiguously accepted contributory negligence
as an affirmative defense in a warranty action, a number of cases
seem to have tended toward this result.38 However, these cases, seem-
ingly permitting contributory negligence as a defense, have actually
involved defenses based upon some form of misuse of the product,
coupled with an actual knowledge of the risk. Referring to the defini-
tional distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, supra, it is obvious that these cases actually permit assumption of
risk, and not contributory negligence, as a defense to the alleged breach
of warranty. As assumption of risk is generally recognized as a defense
to the strict liability of a warranty action,37 these cases may be reconciled
with the general rule that contributory negligence is not a defense to
the strict liability imposed in a warranty action.
Products liability actions may occasionally be brought on a theory of
misrepresentation, when the consumer is injured because of his reliance
upon the manufacturer's implied or express representation of fact,38
given by advertising, labels, or otherwise. These cases generally hold
that:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who by advertis-
ing, labels or otherwise makes to the public a material mis-
representation of fact concerning the character or equality of
a product sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm or
pecuniary loss to a consumer or user of the product when caused
by the user's justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation even
though the misrepresenation is made without knowledge of its
falsity and without negligence.3 9
Whether brought on a tort-deceit or a contract-warranty theory, a
misrepresenation case seeks to impose strict liability on public policy
grounds. It seems clear from the discussion of strict liability in war-
ranty, supra, that the defense of contributory negligence is precluded
here as well.
Finally, it is evident that contributory negligence is a defense to a
products liability action brought in negligence. However, its impact as
a defense will be modified according to (1) the effect given to the
doctrine in each jurisdiction, and (2) the presence of statutory modi-
fications, such as comparative negligence.
35Note, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1963).
36 FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 34.
37Prosser, supra note 9, at 1147; FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 7,
at §16.01(3); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W. 2d 861 (1955);
Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E. 2d 131 (1939).
38 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612
(1958). See also Ruud, Manufacturers Liability for Representations Made
by Their Sales Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 193, at 204
(1961).
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A, Comment n (1965).
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We next consider whether or not contributory negligence is a
defense under the doctrine of strict liability in tort. There is some
diversity of opinion on this matter, with the Restatement of Torts,
Second, holding that contributory negligence, as opposed to assumption
of risk, is not a defense to strict tort liability.40
On the other-hand, there is authority holding that, since the imposi-
tion of strict liability in tort is based on public policy and the doctrine
of allocating risk, exempting the consumer from the burden of proving
the seller's fault, the same policy should insist on limiting strict liability
in face of consumer-fault, where the producer successfully establishes
it.41 It is one thing to exempt the consumer from a traditional burden
of proof which he has found onerous. It is quite another to exempt
him from the traditional consequences of his own fault. This reasoning
would especially apply in a jurisdiction like Wisconsin, where the
principle (if not the letter) or comparative negligence seeks to dis-
tribute the burden of injury proportionately to its causes.
By semantically changing contributory negligence into assumption
of risk, recognized as a defense to strict liability, the result can be
achieved without untoward violence to traditional rules. It is generally
conceded, under strict liability principles, that if the plaintiff con-
tinued to use the product after learning of its dangerous condition, his
recovery will be barred, as he voluntarily assumed the risk of a known
danger. Why should this be so, unless such continued use constituted
want of care for his own safety, and therefore negligence? Logically,
there is no reason why assumption of risk should bar recovery, except
as that conduct amounts to contributory negligence; and, as above
noted, Wisconsin has directly so held.
42
Strict liability doctrines purport, however, to exempt a plaintiff
from negligence in failing to discover the unsafe condition of a product,
unless a prominent warning of its latent dangers is given. In the latter
case, a "seller may reasonably assume that the warning will be read
and heeded."41 3 In any case, a plaintiff is required to use the product
in a normal manner, and within a normal period of time.44 Failure
to do so is not called "contributory negligence," but would presumably
operate to the same effect, regardless of nomenclature. If, in the process
of normal use, the danger of the product would necessarily have been
disclosed to the user, a near-dilemma is reached, for the plaintiff is
trapped between one recognized defense and the other.
The theoretical conclusion, therefore, that contributory negligence
41 Keeton, supra note 9, at 698.
4 McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.
2d 14 (1961).
4 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs §402A, comment j (1965).
44 Id., comment It.
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is not available as a defense to strict liability is diluted somewhat in
practical application. The doctrine of strict liability does not appear
to deny the defensive relevancy of conduct of the kind which conven-
tionally amounts to contributory negligence.
II. INDEMNITY
As the doctrine of indemnity is conventionally defined and applied,
one who has been held liable for the tortious act of another is entitled
to indemnification from the tort feasor, whether contractual relations
existed between them or not.5 The general rule of indemnification is
stated in the Restatement of Restitution46 as follows:
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which
is owed by him but which as between himself and another should
have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from
the other, unless the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of
his conduct.
The right to indemnification is based on the idea that everyone is re-
sponsible for the consequences of his own wrongful conduct, and one
may recover the full amount of damages he has been compelled to pay
because of the wrong of another, the entire burden of loss being shifted
to another who should bear it instead.4 7
However, it is extremely difficult to come to any generic conclusion
as to when indemnity will be permitted and when it will not. In some
jurisdictions, a fairly strict rule prevails; and if one seeking indemnity
has been primarily negligent, or has contributed to the wrong in some
way, he will be denied indemnification. 4 The doctrine of indemnity
has developed in this manner in Illinois, and if a party has paid a claim
based on another's wrongful conduct, he must show that he is blame-
less or bear the whole loss, because of the Illinois general rule pro-
hibiting indemnification between joint tort feasors.4 9
The Illinois rule on indemnity is well illustrated in Schulman v.
Chrysler Corp.5' The brakes on Schulman's car failed, causing her to
strike and injure one Halligan, who brought suit against Schulman for
damages. Schulman brought a third party complaint5' against Chrysler,
seeking indemnity for any damage she would be required to pay
Halligan. In upholding the rule denying indemnity between parties in
pari delicto,52 the court placed Schulman in a dilemma: a finding of
45 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 26, §48.
4 6 
RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION, §76 (1937).
4 Meriam and Thornton, Indewnnity Between Tort Feasors, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv.
845 (1950) ; Kiszkan v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 27 Ill. App. 2d 392, 169
N.E. 2d 814 (1960).4sMeriam and Thornton, supra note 47, at 850.
49 An analytical statement of the rule and its development in Illinois appears
in McDonald v. Trampf, 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 198 N.E. 2d 537 (1964).
50 31 Ill. App. 2d 168, 175 N.E. 2d 590 (1961).
5 1 ILL. RiEV. STAT., Ch. 110, §25(2) (1959).
52 See generally Yankey v. Bohlin and Son, Inc., 37 Ill. App. 2d 457, 186 N.E.
1965]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
negligence against Schulman would preclude any right to indemnity
from Chrysler, as Schulman would then be a joint tort feasor at best.
On the other hand, if Schulman were found not liable to Halligan,
there would be no need for indemnity.
Suvada presented an enigma, as both parties were considered to be
tort feasors, but they were neither joint tort feasors nor in pari delicto.
While Suvada's liability rested in negligence, Bendix was held strictly
liable in tort. "Suvada's negligence would not however.., prevent him
from seeking indemnification from Bendix."53 Thus, Suvada has
opened a new theory of indemnity between tort feasors in Illinois,
permitting a consumer of a defective product, who has negligently
injured another by use of the product, to shift the entire legal obligation
back to the manufacturer and seller of the defective product. Indemnity,
by the Suvada doctrine, is therefore not limited to those who are per-
sonally free from fault ;54 but is granted simply because a strong public
policy insists upon distribution of the economic burden of injury in
the most socially desirable manner. That policy requires, in the court's
apparent view, that the indemnitee's fault be judicially ignored. This
reasoning enabled the court to look past the active-passive, primary-
secondary pitfalls55 of standard indemnity, and grant indemnity to one
who was himself a tort feasor.
Wisconsin's law of indemnity has not yet assumed as clearly defined
a form as that of Illinois, and any consideration of Wisconsin's principle
of indemnification in a future products liability case, based on strict
liability in tort, is pure speculation. In Jacobs v. General Accident Fire
and Life Assurance Corp.,5 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
• . . the granting of indenmity in any situation represents a
judicial choice of policy. We decide that in a case like the present
one, there is no distinction between the tort feasors with respect
to the casual relationship between their conduct and the injury,
the negligent tort feasor is not entitled to indemnity from the
grossly negligent one. (Emphasis added)
Here, then, was a situation in which Wisconsin denied indemnity, even
though the parties were not in strict pari delicto.
Considering, however, that the Wisconsin doctrines of comparative
contributions 57 and comparative negligence accomplish much the same
results as does the doctrine of indemnity in other jurisdictions, some
illiberality toward indemnity in Wisconsin is understandable. Never-
theless, Wisconsin's "judicial choice of policy" will be a difficult one
2d 57 (1962); Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 12, 184 N.E.
2d 808 (1962.
53- Il. 2d at -, 210 N.E. 2d at 188.
54 See generally PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 26, §48.
55 Note, 1964 ILL. L. FORUM 614, 615 (1964).
56 14 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 109 N.W. 2d 462, 467, (1961).
57 Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
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if a case of the Suvada type arises. Assuming Wisconsin's acceptance
of strict products liability in tort, comparative contribution will be an
awkward solution for reasons explained below. Indemnity, if permitted,
may compel a "judicial choice of policy" opposite to that adopted in
Jacobs, supra, despite that fact that "... there is no distinction between
the tort feasors with respect to the causual relationship between their
conduct and the injury."
III. CONTRIBUTION
Indemnification, granted on the basis of a disparity of duty or of
type of liability between tort feasors, and which shifts the entire burden
from one to another, is not to be confused with the equitable right to
contribution, which distributes a jointly-caused loss among the tort
feasors.
Contribution is conventionally defined as the right of one who has
discharged a common liability or burden to recover from another, who
is also liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to bear.5s The Restate-
ment of Restitution, Section 81, defines the right as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, a person who has discharged more
than his proportionate share of a duty owed by himself and
another as to which, between the two, neither had a prior duty
of performance, is entitled to contribution from the other, except
where the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct.
In the general application of the doctrine of contribution, one who
is compelled to pay or satisfy the whole loss, or bear more than his
just share of a common burden or obligation, upon which several
persons are equally liable, or which they are bound to discharge, is
entitled to contribution from the others, so that each party pays his
respective share of the loss. "
In Illinois, if two or more tort feasors have acted concertedly and
intentionally in pari delicto, contribution between them is prohibited.6 0
If the parties have not acted so as to be commonly liable, in pari delicto,
Illinois law permits one tort feasor to recover against another according
to the relative delinquency of the parties. A tort feasor whose contri-
bution to the harm was merely "passive" is permitted contribution
from one who "actively" caused it.61 On this basis, it would seem that
there could be no contribution in a strict liability tort action in Illinois,
although this issue apparently has never been before an Illinois court.
s See generally Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81
U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y.
314, 107 N.E. 2d 463 (1952).
59 PRossFR, op. cit. supra note 26, §47.
60 Schulman v. Chrysler Corp., 31 Ill. App. 2d 168, 175 N.E. 2d 590 (1961);
McDonald v. Trampf, 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 198 N.E. 2d 537 (1964).6 1 Rovekamp v. Central Construction Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 441, 195 N.E. 2d 756




For example, Suvada's negligence toward the bus passengers and
Bendix's strict liability to Suvada could not be classified on an active-
passive basis, as the true comparison in such a case is between fault
(negligence) and non-fault (strict liability). To attempt such a compari-
son would seem to frustrate the policy of strict liability, because Bendix's
liability would thereby become something less than negligence liability.
Likewise, contribution between two strictly liable persons is impossible
to square with conventional concepts, essentially because strict liability
lacks any property by which it can be weighed or compared, even with
its own kind. The situation exactly fits the Illinois rule, denying con-
tribution when the parties are in pari delicto.
In Wisconsin, however, contribution is allowed only when the tort
feasors are under a common liability and in pari delicto,62 and then is
given in proportion to each tort feasor's relative fault, under the prin-
ciple of the Comparative Negligence Statute.63 The statute applies, in
terms, only to negligence, and cannot, therefore, be literally applied in
strict liability situations. Disregarding this problem, a far more funda-
mental difficulty remains: How is one factor, valued in terms of
causual fault, to be compared with another, valued in terms of strict
liability? Or, in another case, how are the strict liabilities of a manu-
facturer, a wholesale distributor, and a retail distributor to be com-
paratively evaluated, one with another, when all three are liable simply
as sellers of the same product?
The questions are impossible of solution at this early stage of
development of the strict liability doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of strict tort liability as a new cause of action does not
itself work a revolutionary change in products liability law. One would
not expect either courts or attorneys to encounter any insurmountable
obstacles in applying the principles to simple consumer-seller cases.
However, Suvada demonstrates that problems must be anticipated in
the restatement of those legal and equitable principles which are col-
lateral to the direct problem of compensating the primary victim of
tort. Indemnity, contribution, assumption of risk, and contributory
negligence have developed as subordinate aspects of fault-based liability,
especially negligence, and have adopted, in conventional statement, much
of the languge of the fault principle.
Strict liability, however, is based on a principle of public policy,
by which the central objective is to allocate loss in the most socially
desirable manner. Conduct which may be innocent under the fault
principle is thereby proscribed, and guilty conduct under the fault
principle, is, in a measure, ignored. This makes it substantially im-
62Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
63 WIs. STAT. §331.045 (1963).
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possible to apply conventional rules of indemnity, contribution, assump-
tion of risk, or contributory negligence, without extensive redefinition,
to cases founded on strict liability. The underlying theories of the two
are incompatible.
TiaOMAS E. OBENBERGER
Taxation: Determination of Gross Income for Percentage De-
pletion Purposes-In Dravo Corporation v. United States,' the United
States Court of Claims added another link to the chain of cases ques-
tioning Section 613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Court,
inter alia, held that Dravo Corporation (hereafter referred to as Dravo)
for the tax year 1955 must compute its gross income for depletion pur-
poses2 by using per ton prices at the dredges rather than the per ton
prices at the shore installations. The latter prices included various trans-
portation and stockpiling costs.
The depletion issue concerns deposits dredges from an island in the
Ohio River, transported to shore installations, and sold during 1955.
The deposits were extracted by two dredges which performed the
washing and sizing operations. Since stockpiling on the dredges was a
practical impossibility, the sand and gravel was then moved to barges
adjacent to the dredges. The first general category of Dravo's cus-
tomers included those who utilized their own barges to pick up the sand
and gravel at Dravo's dredges or made special arrangements with Dravo
to deliver direct from the barges to the customer's location. The proceeds
from the sand and gravel sales to customers in this first classification
were not involved in the contest since these proceeds were derived from
sale of products which never reached Dravo's shore installations. The
controversy applied to the sand and gravel, about fifty per cent of
Dravo's tonnage for 1955, which was sold to the second category of
customers-those who purchased at the shore installations. Dravo owned
1348 F. 2d 542 (1965).
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 736, §613(c), 68A Stat. 209:
(c) DEFINITION OF GROSS INCOME FROM PROPERTY-For purposes of this
section-
(1) GROSS INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY-The term "gross income from the
property" means, in the case of a property other than an oil or gas
well, the gross income from mining.
(2) MINING-The term "mining" includes not merely the extraction of
the ores or minerals from the ground but also the ordinary treatment
processes normally applied by mine owners or operators in order to
obtain the commercially marketable mineral product or products, and
bw iiuc oi tne transportation of ores or minerals (whether or x,,,
by common carrier) from the point of extraction from the ground
to the plants or mills in which the ordinary treatment processes are
applied thereto as is not in excess of 50 miles unless the Secretary
or his delegate finds that the physical and other requirements are
such that the ore or mineral must be transported a greater distance
to such plants or mills.
Subsection (4) of section 613(c) contained the original list of "ordinary treat-
ment processes" then considered in computing gross income from property.
